What's Hot in Workers's Comp

 By Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, P.C.

 
This special report contains the top 10 developments in New Jersey, Delaware & Pennslyvania in 2013
 
 
 
TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
 
By Dario J. Badalamenti, Esq.
 
 
1.         An employee whose job required that he travel from his home to various schools was denied benefits for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident while driving home from work as he was not specifically compensated for mileage or travel time by his employer for time spent traveling to and from his job site.
Terebush v. Creative Safety Products, Docket No. A-3179-11T2, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2771 (App. Div., decided December 19, 2012).
According to N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the so-called “going and coming rule,” employment commences when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment and terminates when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment. A finding that an employee is specifically compensated for mileage or travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a remote job site will often be sufficient to trigger the “travel time exception” to the going and coming rule.
 
 
2.         A workers’ compensation carrier’s cancellation of a policy due to the insured’s refusal to permit a loss control audit was nullified by the Judge of Compensation because the carrier’s cancellation notice did not specifically advise the insured that it could reinstate its insurance policy by permitting the carrier to conduct the requested audit.
Osorto v. FMF Construction, Docket No. A-3236-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 252 (App. Div., decided January 25, 2013).
N.J.S.A. 34:15-81 is the controlling statute in determining if a workers’ compensation policy has been properly cancelled.
 
 
3.         A specific medical connection between a work-related event and an injury is not required to trigger the notice requirement under N.J.S.A. 34:15-17.
Ader v. Lebanon Township, Docket No. A-0383-11T2, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 555 (App. Div., decided March 11, 2013).
N.J.S.A. 34:15-17 requires that an employee seeking compensation notify his employer of injuries sustained in a work-related accident within a maximum period of 90 days.
 
 
4.         A school bus driver injured while cleaning the interior of her bus—off premises and between runs—was acting in the scope and course of her employment as the cleaning of the bus was an integral part of her job for which she received additional compensation.
Benvenutti v. Scholastic Bus Company, Docket No. A-3732-11T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 739 (App. Div., decided April 4, 2013).
There must generally be a finding that the off-premises employee was performing his or her work responsibilities at the time of the injury. However, an employee may not need to be actually performing the work of the employer to be protected under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act. The so-called “minor deviation doctrine” provides that injuries sustained while employees are engaged in personally motivated, but customary or reasonably expected activities, such as smoking, eating or using the bathroom, are also compensable.
 
 
5.         The employer, who knowingly ignored various safety precautions and regulations by removing a safety mechanism from a wood grinder, was not subject to liability in tort because this behavior did not constitute an “intentional wrong” sufficient to overcome the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Lemus v. Caterpillar Corporation, Docket No. A-4069-11T2, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1181 (App. Div., decided May 16, 2013).
Although N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 provides the exclusive remedy available to employees injured by accident during the scope of their employment, an employee may bring an action against his employer at common law for any act or omission that is an intentional wrong. This is the so-called “intentional tort” exception.
 
 
6.         An employee who knew he had a significant knee injury, who was aware of the inevitability of knee replacement surgery, and who believed that his knee pathology was the result of his employment had the requisite knowledge of the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment sufficient to begin running of the statute of limitations for filing a claim under N.J.S.A. 34:15-34.
Lattoz v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, Docket No. A-4335-11T2, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1348 (App. Div., decided June 5, 2013).
N.J.S.A. 34:15-34 provides that, “Where a claimant knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment, all claims for compensation or compensable occupational disease . . . shall be barred unless a petition is filed . . . within two years after the date on which the claimant first knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment.”
 
 
7.         An injury sustained by a personal trainer on her employer’s premises did not arise out of her employment because she was not training anyone at the time of the accident, had changed out of her uniform and into her own workout clothes, and was working out on her own when the accident occurred.
Patterson v. The Atlantic Club, Docket No. A-0657-12T1, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1716 (App. Div., decided July 11, 2013).
For compensation under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act to apply, an employee’s injuries must have been caused by an accident both arising out of and in the course of employment. The “in the course of employment” inquiry looks to time, place and circumstances of the accident, while the “arising out of employment” inquiry looks to causal nexus between the accident and the employment.
 
8.         An employer may recover a faultless overpayment of workers’ compensation benefits from an employee when it can establish unjust enrichment and an absence of circumstances making it inequitable to require the employee’s reimbursement of the overpayment.
Weiner v. Elizabeth Board of Education, Docket No. A-0627-12T2, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1729 (App. Div., decided July 15, 2013).
The Judge of Compensation is to determine if the employee was unjustly enriched under settled principles of unjust enrichment, an issue for which the employer has the burden of proof. If successful in doing so, the employer may then institute enforcement proceedings in Superior Court.
 
 
9.         A Judge of Compensation may draw an “adverse inference” from a petitioner’s failure to produce either the testimony or records of his treating physician when the records and opinion of the treating physician would be highly relevant and probative.
Donato v. Jersey City Municipal Utilities Authority, Docket No. A-5984-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2074 (App. Div., decided August 21, 2013).
“Adverse inference” refers to a circumstance wherein the finder of fact concludes that evidence was not produced because it would be unfavorable to the non-producing party.
 
 
10.       An employer who pays workers’ compensation benefits to an employee is entitled to a lien against her third party settlement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, even though it was ultimately determined that the employee’s injury was not compensable.
Greene v. AIG Casualty Co., Docket No. A-6278-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 149 ( App. Div. October 16, 2013).
Although N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 permits an injured worker to both collect compensation benefits and pursue an action against a third-party tortfeasor, the employer is entitled to reimbursement from the proceeds of any such third party action.
 
For additional information, contact Dario at djbadalamenti@mdwcg.com or 973.618.4122
 
 
 
 
TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN DELAWARE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
 
 

 

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